Our paper charts the evolution of labour market and welfare policy in the UK since the mid-1990s, with the aim of gauging the impact and influence of European level policy initiatives on the policymaking process. Our main focus is on the 'welfare to work' agenda developed by the Labour government after 1997, a programme of changes to labour market regulation, social benefits, and labour activation institutions which in many interesting ways parallels the agenda of the European Employment Strategy.
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Introduction
A well-known, but probably fictitious headline in a London newspaper once read 'Fog Over the Channel, Continent Isolated'. Whether or not such a headline was ever written, it reflects an Anglocentric view of the world which can still be detected in contemporary British politics. A historically documented example is Margaret Thatcher's claim that 'during my lifetime most of the problems the world has faced have come, in one fashion or other, from mainland Europe, and the solutions from outside it' (Thatcher 2002: 320) 1 . In other words, Britain has nothing to learn from Europe. As well as underpinning British suspicion of European Union initiatives hostility to further European integration, this view also acts as an obstacle to policy-borrowing from other European countries. The UK would appear to be unpromising terrain for EU efforts to promote policy coordination in welfare and labour market policy.
Our paper charts the evolution of labour market and welfare policy in the UK since the mid1990s, with the aim of gauging the impact and influence European level policy initiatives on the policymaking process, and the usages of Europe by political actors at the UK national level. We test out the hypotheses relevant to the UK case (ie RH2, the impact of traditions of Euroskepticism or enthusiasm and RH3 the impact of fit/misfit of national with European institutions). Our main focus is on the 'welfare to work' agenda developed by the Labour government after 1997, a programme of changes to labour market regulation, social benefits, and labour activation institutions which in many interesting ways parallels the agenda of the European Employment Strategy. This case is of particular importance to the understanding of how Europe impacts on welfare reforms for a number of reasons.
First of all, because Britain has undergone quite sharp transformations in its welfare regime over the past three decades, beginning quite soon after the UK join the European Community. This provides an opportunity to gauge what influences have shaped an important case of quite radical welfare reform.
Second, Britain is notoriously an 'awkward partner' (George 1998) in the EU, with a traditionally Euroskeptic political class and electorate. Assessing how Europe is used in such a crucial case is therefore a key test of theories of Europeanization. Finally, British governments' attitudes to Europe have varied quite markedly as parties alternated in power, providing us with a large degree of variance in one of the key variables of interest.
Our paper analyzes the political context and discursive presentation of UK policy changes in this area, in the form of a brief historical narrative of the reform process and its political backdrop, and then goes on to address specifically how the European employment-friendly welfare agenda has interacted with recent developments in the UK. What we find is that, paradoxically, the UK has been remarkably in line with European initiatives, yet has been one of the most reluctant to draw on Europe for templates of or inspiration for policy change. Indeed if anything, Europe is seen as a 'counter-2 model' against which UK policy has been framed. The contradictory result of these developments is that Britain has converged substantially with other European countries' welfare arrangements whilst rejecting Europe as a source of ideas or 'political cover' for welfare reform. The next section presents some background on the UK's relationship with Europe, followed by an account of the process of welfare reform, and then by an assessment of the influences and usages of Europe, and other sources of policy ideas, in the UK case. The final section concludes.
The Background to the British Case: From 'Awkward Partner' to the 'Heart of Europe'?
The UK is a tough test for 'Europeanization' hypotheses for a variety of reasons. First, and most obviously, it is one of the EU member states with the highest proportion of unfavourable reactions to Europe in opinion polls, a consistent result over time and across surveys (Evans and Butt 2005) . This contrasts markedly with more Euro-enthusiastic member states where popular opinion has tended for most of the history of the European project to have positive reactions to the concept of Europe and to European initiatives. Moreover, this generally reluctant attitude towards European integration is shared across the political spectrum, with the possible exception of the Liberal Democrats. The UK chose to remain on the sidelines during the initial discussions on European integration and joined the then
European Community only in 1973 under a Conservative government, after a difficult period in which
France opposed British membership (George 1992) . However, the Conservatives were never wholly the party of Europe, at the time they perhaps just seemed more so than Labour. Both parties, however, have vacillated on Britain's place in Europe and at various times have been riven by internal splits on the issue.
In the referendum held on continuing British membership of the EEC in 1975, the Labour party split starkly between the leadership, in favour, and the membership and trade unions, mostly against.
The Labour left, in particular, was hostile to Europe, and in the 1983 election manifesto managed to win a commitment from the party to withdraw from the Community. Labour's crushing defeat in that election, and the resulting moderation of party policy across a range of issues under Neil Kinnock, To some extent, the EES -which focused more on job creation than on redistribution -did not match Britain's specific labour market concerns. The thinking behind the EES was strongly influenced by circumstances prevailing in large continental EU member states such as France and Germany, which faced stubbornly high levels of unemployment, and whose macroeconomic policy priorities were nuanced tracing of the processes leading to these events can help us develop a clearer understanding of the extent to which European initiatives influenced British policy developments, but a degree of ambiguity inevitably remains, since these processes are both influenced by broader changes in they ways in which academics and policymakers think about welfare systems. We will attempt to resolve this methodological dilemma by juxtaposing a chronological analysis of policy developments with an attempt to discover the intellectual and political origins of the policies and strategies adopted at the UK and EU levels.
Welfare to Work: Employment-Friendly Welfare Policy, British Style
The ideological and discursive underpinning of Labour's approach was the 'Third Way' doctrine developed by Anthony Giddens (1998), which emphasized the importance of globalization, and critiqued both the market fundamentalism of the right and the over-emphasis on state interventionism of the traditional left. As Blair himself put it in a Fabian pamphlet in 1998, the Third Way located itself between an 'old Left preoccupied by state control, high taxation, and producer interests and a New Right treating public investment, and often the very notions of society and collective endeavour, as evils to be undone' (Blair 1998) . This centrist approach also provided a response to Labour's electoral dilemma: in order to win a parliamentary majority, Labour needed to move beyond its natural support base amongst manual workers, public sector workers and welfare dependants and appeal also to the aspirational middle-income groups which had benefited from some Thatcherite reforms. Labour's response to labour market problems was therefore a mix of social concern on the one hand, and pro-market and business-friendly thinking on the other. But the use of the 7 term 'social exclusion' instead of any reference to fairness or inequality pointed to a reluctance to openly redistribute income from the wealthy to the poor.
In practice therefore, Labour intended to resolve the problem of poverty by encouraging greater participation in the labour market, so that the poor could improve their situation through paid work rather than increased government transfers. As Brown himself clearly stated, 'the best form of welfare is work ' (1999 ' ( , cited in Sloam 2007 . This approach ticked a number of boxes for Labour's ambitious political leadership: it covered political fronts on both the left and right, fitted in with the rhetorical and ideological shift the party was seeking to make, and, fortunately, also could inform policies which had a chance of working effectively. This focus on supply-side measures fitted in with the emerging consensus around the possibilities for social democratic interventions in an increasingly globalized economy (Boix 1998 ), a strategy adopted by the Clinton administration in the US and which therefore achieved a high profile in intellectual and policy circles. This restrictive approach to progressive politics excluded the macroeconomy from consideration, since it was assumed that fiscal or monetary policies would provoke immediate and negative responses from financial markets (the Mitterrand presidency's experience of the early 1980s constituting the key 'stylized fact' in this argument). A supply-side focus was also visible in the EES, with its emphasis on 'employability, entrepreneurship, adaptability and equal opportunities'. With fiscal and monetary policy 'locked in' by EMU, the EES also restricted its attention to supply-side measures, so European-level initiatives did not enter fundamentally into conflict with the objectives and priorities of the Labour government in London.
The rolling out of Labour policies in this area coincided to a significant degree with the European-level initiatives related to the EES. However there is some evidence to suggest that Labour's employment-friendly welfare reforms were in the pipeline before the European level had the chance to influence UK policy. The main features of the EES were laid down at the Luxembourg Jobs Summit and adopted at the European Council of November 1997. By this time the Labour government in London was already in an advanced state of preparation for legislating on labour market issues.
Labour's push for a supply-side solution to unemployment built on existing patterns of labour market and welfare state organization, which were at least superficially based upon the principle of active rather than passive support. Conservative reforms in the 1980s had pared back the insurance principle by deindexing and cutting unemployment benefits, culminating in the elimination of passive unemployment compensation in the Jobseekers Act of 1995 (King 1995). The 1995 reform formally made receipt of benefits conditional on 'active' jobseeking, requiring recipients to provide proof of their efforts and placing restrictions on eligibility for benefits if job opportunities were turned down.
Although this reform, in the absence of other measures, was not particularly close to the thinking behind the EES, it did constitute an institutional legacy which could easily be adapted to a more 'activation'-based agenda. 8 Further evidence that the main ideas in the EES had been picked up by Labour well before can be found in the Labour party manifesto of 1997, which made a clear commitment to 'get 250,000 young unemployed off benefit and into work', and a more generic commitment to an 'early Budget to get people off welfare and into work'. Very soon after, policy announcements were made that laid down the basic contours of Labour's welfare and labour market policies over the successive period. The July 1997 Budget presented by Gordon Brown contained a number of commitments which had a good deal in common with the thinking behind the EES, but preceded European developments chronologically.
The Budget speech 3 stated that 'in place of welfare there should be work', and outlined four work and training options for 18-25-year olds on Jobseekers Allowance, measures to support lone parents and the disabled seeking to work, a National Childcare Strategy, individual learning accounts (lifelong learning), and announced the imminent adoption of a minimum wage and tax credits to support lowpaid workers and incentivize employment. Although the subsequent legislation for these measures was spread out over the following years (in particular 1997-2002) , the intellectual framework for policy was publicly announced at various points before and immediately after the 1997 elections, and in any case comfortably before the European Employment Strategy was finally decided. These programmes were clearly in syntony with the 1998 Employment Guidelines under the EES which exhorted member states to tackle youth and long-term unemployment, and adopt active rather than passive measures to meet the problem 4 . Yet it is equally clear that the Labour projects were developed before, or at the least contemporaneously with, the development of the EES (see Table One ).
( The same can be said for other measures which complemented and consolidated the New Deal activation strategy. The national minimum wage was a well established Labour commitment and its introduction was announced in Brown's July 1997 budget, although a commission was established to determine the level at which it would be set and the minimum wage was not implemented until April 1999. Again this is consistent with the EES' insistence in the Employment Guidelines that poverty traps blocking the employment of those out of work should be removed, and again this was a longstanding Labour policy, which effectively dates back to the abolition of the wages councils by the Major government in 1993, opposed by the Labour party at the time. The incentive effects of the minimum wage were particularly relevant to unemployed people without family responsibilities; however, a poverty trap would remain for the unemployed with children, since their higher level of benefits would be removed if they rejoined the labour market.
The response to this was the adoption of 'tax credits', which subsidized the income of low paid workers according to certain criteria to ensure a higher minimum income for families. These credits (Working Families Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit) enabled low-skilled workers to earn enough in the labour market to compensate for the loss of social benefits on achieving employment. Complementary to these measures were moves to provide more widely available and affordable childcare facilities -in which Britain lagged badly behind most of the EU in the mid-1990s -in order to encourage unemployed lone parents to take up paid employment. These measures contributed to the increased attractiveness of employment for workers at the low-wage end of the labour market and were therefore in line with EES guidance for 1998, which advocated 'gradually reducing the overall tax burden and, where appropriate, a target for gradually reducing the fiscal pressure on labour and non-wage labour costs, in particular on relatively unskilled and low-paid labour'. The tax credits were again trailed in Labour policy announcements before the 1997 election and referred to in the July 1997 budget, although design and implementation took rather longer than in the case of the New Deal: the Taylor report recommending these changes was published in 1998 These measures were outlined in some detail in the 1998 budget delivered by Gordon Brown as
Chancellor of the Exchequer, under the rubric 'Making Work Pay'. The chronology of welfare reforms in the UK and the development of the European Employment Strategy suggests strongly that the Labour party was already committed to implementing these measures before the EES had taken shape, and certainly before any substantial requirements to adopt these policies had been presented by the 10 European institutions. Field research by Mikkel Mailand based on interviews concluded that policymakers barely ever referred to the EMS in policy debates (2009: 164) . Indeed, there is some evidence that the causal chain was inverted, with Britain claiming some credit for having pushed Europe into adopting British-style reforms (for instance, Gordon Brown's 1997 Pre-budget report stated that 'the Government launched its own Employment Action Plan in October and suggested other EU member states do the same' 6 ). However, given the ambiguities involved in establishing the exact temporal causal order of these largely contemporaneous events, we require more evidence before rejecting the hypothesis that European influences affected British policy. The next section reconstructs the genealogy of Labour's welfare to work reforms, and shows how influences from the US, and to an extent from non-EU countries (before 1995) such as Sweden, predate EU-wide developments, and suggests that these experiences were more important in shaping the thinking of UK policymakers.
Usages of Europe and Alternative Models: Labour's Reforms in Britain and the British Reform Agenda in Europe
The The resulting mix, interestingly, uses state intervention -both supply-side and redistributive -to enhance flexibility as an anti-poverty measure. Flexibility could only work as an anti-poverty strategy because of two specific characteristics of worklessness in the UK: the low replacement rates and ungenerous welfare benefits available to the workless, and the very low wages paid at the bottom end of the skills spectrum in the British labour market. This meant that, with a combination of activation and some transfers, large numbers of the poor could be made better off by joining the labour market, whilst their entry into paid work would enhance the efficiency of the labour market and reduce government 11 spending over all. This very 'third way' solution, however, was not easily transferable to other European countries, since in most of the other EU member states wage dispersion was much lower than in the UK, whilst out of work benefits were either more generous, or in some cases, non-existent. The peculiarities of the British labour market were therefore a further limiting factor in Labour deploying European-level political resources to legitimize domestic policy choices, or in 'downloading' European policy templates.
What were the policy templates for the welfare reform programme? Here the story becomes complex. On the one hand, the long history of activation-oriented policies developed in small Northern European social democracies (which incidentally partly shared Britain's Euroskeptic instincts, and in the case of Sweden and Finland only joined the EU in 1995) provided a rich stock of experience in the implementation of these kinds of measures. That these experiences were noted and drawn upon is . This strategy was based on the understanding that legitimizing reform proposals by referring to European citizenship duties is not an option for any UK government intent on seeing its reforms actually implemented. By blaming the EU for embarking upon reforms, the government would simply hand the opposition an easy target to undermine its proposals.
As Mailand argues 'Euroscepticism (…) represents a barrier to the impact of the EES, because references to it under such circumstances may not be helpful ' (2009: 167) .
14 Neither can the government effectively use Europe as a stick or carrot to push its reform agenda.
Where in other member states reform coalitions can sometimes be formed against the threat of otherwise missing the boat of European integration (cf Italian and Spanish entry into EMU), Brown's five criteria for membership of EMU effectively ruled out entry into the foreseeable future. Similarly, the UK cannot be spurred into action by reference to compliance with the Lisbon Strategy. The British record on market liberalisation, employment and growth is in fact relatively good; if anything, the UK reformed ahead of the other member states in economic areas. Thus, the need to meet targets agreed at Council level does not carry the same weight in the British domestic debate as it may in some other member states for the simple reason that the UK either is not interested in joining (as in the case of EMU) or because it already outperforms other member states (as on many of the items on the Lisbon Agenda). The European Employment Strategy has had little impact on UK policy simply because the UK was already in compliance before 1997 (Mailand 2009: 167) .
Finally, the UK's balance of power between the government and opposition (described with only a little exaggeration as an 'elected dictatorship') obviates the need for the executive to use Europe to strengthen its hand vis-à-vis the parliament. In the Westminster model (Lijphart 1999) governments rest on majority control of the House of Commons, and the fusion of government and parliamentary leadership around the Prime Minister, allied to tight party discipline, gives governments a relatively free hand in normal circumstances to enact legislation. This deprives the British domestic debate of yet another possible usage of Europe, namely as a bargaining asset for the government over legislators with less direct access to discussions in Brussels.
Usages of Europe: The EU as an arena for British Policy Entrepreneurship
Though there appear to be few (or no) incentives for British politicians and policy-makers to evoke Europe in the domestic reform debate, we do not want to claim that there are no usages of Europe in the UK. For example, the same tilted balance of power towards the executive that deprives the government of the need to use the information advantages offered by Europe to improve its position over Parliament, forms part of the explanation for the UK's comparatively good record on the implementation of EU directives. But we find evidence for Europeanization more through 'obligatory' rather than soft channels. It is relatively easy for the British government to get European directives translated and adopted into domestic law through its parliamentary majority, and as Falkner et al (2007) find, Britain's complicance with EU measures revolves around domestic politics. but there is no real incentive for the government to be as vigorous on recommendations. Thus, for example, in the area of social policy, Annesley (2003) In sum though, we find that participants in the domestic political debate deliberately abstain from invoking European references to introduce, discuss and defend reform proposals. This goes further than a strategic denial of European influences; policy-makers and politicians from both the government and opposition parties simply seem not to have any incentives to use Europe in the domestic arena for fear of creating a backlash among a skeptical public and among its own supporters. Moreover, in the area of employment-friendly welfare reforms, the UK seems to have been ahead of the curve in Europe.
New Labour, particularly during its first term in office, has been an early, enthusiastic experimenter with employment-friendly welfare reforms, taking its cues mainly from other Anglo-Saxon countries.
It introduced its flagship workfare programme, tax credits for working families, and other programmes to tackle social exclusion when the EES was still nascent and other OMCs were not yet on the horizon.
In fact, the UK's headstart on employment-friendly reforms in addition to its ability to present a coherent platform in Brussels (the strong executive leaves much less room for internecine fighting among various Ministeries) has arguably presented the UK government with an opportunity to upload its preferences to the European level on issues such a welfare reform and social inclusion.
Here we find stronger evidence of a connection between European initiatives and the British policy process. Part of Blair's project of putting Britain 'back into the heart of Europe' was as a proactive policy leader, persuading European governments of the need for economic reform. There was a 16 foreign policy rationale behind this policy of engagement, as Blair himself explained: 'the fact is that Europe is today the only route through which Britain can exercise power and influence. If it is to maintain its historic role as a global player, Britain has to be a central part of the politics of Europe'
(cited in Bache and Nugent 2007: 533 
Conclusion
The adoption of 'welfare to work' by the New Labour government in the UK has paradoxical implications for our discussion of usages of Europe in welfare and employment policy. On the one hand, Labour's policies challenge the traditional view of the UK as a Euroskeptic nation happy to defy European initiatives and content to follow its own distinctive path. The 'welfare to work' programme adopted by Labour fits so neatly with the priorities of the European Employment Strategy that it is tempting to conclude that Tony Blair succeeded in reversing Britain's slide towards 'semi-detached' status in the European Union. On the other, close analysis of the twin processes of policy change in the UK and the development of European initiatives in the field of employment and welfare suggest otherwise. The 'goodness of fit' between UK and European policy is instead the result of British policymakers being influenced by the same thinking that also influenced the European Employment Strategy, drawn from the experiences of non-EU countries such as the United States and Sweden.
The UK and the European Union were influenced, together and separately, by the 'flexibility' agenda promoted by international institutions (particularly the OECD), but this agenda could not be neatly applied to European welfare capitalism without dramatic (and improbable) institutional changes.
Instead, labour market flexibility had to be 'crafted' onto existing welfare arrangements, a tall order for EU member states with 'Bismarckian' institutional legacies, high wage and firing costs, and generous welfare benefits. The UK, with its flexible labour market, dispersed wage structure and minimalist welfare provision, was much better placed to adopt 'welfare to work' policies, and not surprisingly did so before most other EU countries. As a result, the UK was ahead of the curve with regard to the agenda of welfare reform which ultimately formed the basis of the European Employment Strategy.
To an extent the coincidence between British and European policy developments is also the result of the UK governments' attempts to influence the content of the EES, and encourage other With regard to the central hypotheses of this project, the British case offers substantial support to RH2 and RH3 (RH1 not being directly relevant to the UK case, a relatively 'old' member state). RH2
predicts that countries with strong traditions of Euroskepticism will see less and less positive usages of Europe in reform processes, and this prediction is amply borne out by the UK case: in Britain, both elites and (especially) public opinion are instinctively at the Euroskeptic end of the scale, and this has been accompanied with at best neglect, and at worse rejection and denial, of Europe in policy discourse.
RH3 predicts that institutional 'misfit' will also provoke negative usages of Europe, and again the British case offers supporting evidence, although more ambivalent in this case: Britain found it rather easy to adopt the liberalizing measures contained in the European Employment Strategy and Lisbon agenda, since those projects were in part the result of British pressures to push Europe towards policies more amenable to the UK. However, the broad institutional framework of British labour market and welfare policy was rather less well adapted to European initiatives, since measures such as the Working Time Directive clashed with British labour market flexibility and employer autonomy.
Here then, the findings are more ambiguous; even though Labour was enthusiastic in its support for the liberal and flexicurity agendas in Europe, it did not evoke them openly to justify its own reform strategy, even when the 'fit' was quite high. In sum, usages of Europe in British labour market reform were broadly negative and often absent, and the dynamics of reform seem to respond to domestic political imperatives on the one hand, and international, even global, economic imperatives on the other. Europe remains the 'elephant in the room' in British politics, a problem rather than a resource, and one which will not go away.
